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Abstract: Two principles shaping agreement paradigms have been implicitly as-
sumed to constitute diachronic universals: (i) ergativity is assumed to be more
likely to develop or be maintained in third than in non-third person; (ii) zeros are
assumed to develop and be preserved more commonly in third than in non-third
person. Estimating probabilities of diachronic change in a worldwide database
and controling for areal diffusion effects, we find no evidence for (i). Principle (ii)
receives no support either when examining how paradigms develop as systems,
but we observe a weak cross-paradigm effect which is likely to be caused by fre-
quency patterns during grammaticalization.
1 Introduction
As has been repeatedly noted in the typological literature, most – perhaps even
all – statistical universals are not really synchronic in nature, but are rather the
result of underlying diachronic mechanisms that cause languages to change in
preferred or ‘natural’ ways (e.g. Greenberg 1978, Bybee 1988, Hall 1988, Croft
2003, among others). Diachronic universals are not only of interest to typology
and inquiries into the cognitive factors that shape human language, but they
are also essential for historical linguistics and the reconstruction of the pre-
history of individual languages or language families: when choosing between
possible reconstructions, there is good reason to prefer ‘natural’ over ‘unnatural’
sound laws (Blevins 2004). A good illustration of this principle comes from
work on Proto-Polynesian (Donohue & Oppenheimer 2012). The cognate word
for ‘nose’ in Central Pacific languages shows an intervocalic /h/ in the majority of
languages, as in Tongan ihu, while only one language of the group, namely Emae,
shows intervocalic /s/, as in isu. If reconstruction were to follow a linguistically
uninformed ‘majority-wins’ or maximum parsimony guideline, one would be
tempted to reconstruct */ihu/. However, as noted by Donohue & Oppenheimer
(2012:542), given what we know about the typology of sound changes, one would
ceteris paribus reconstruct */isu/ and hypothesize a natural rule of lenition rather
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than the other way around (also cf. Campbell 1999:116). ‘Natural’ here means in
line with theoretically-motivated and universal expectations about diachrony.
Establishing diachronic universals is no trivial enterprise. Using only recon-
struction is not a viable option, since reconstruction often relies on assumptions
about what is natural and universal in the first place. Using historically attested
changes gets us further, but quickly runs into a severe sampling problem because
there are only very few families in the world of which we know the history with
any confidence. One way out that is currently being explored (e.g. Maslova 2000,
Dunn et al. 2011, Bickel 2015) is based on statistical explorations of synchronic
data with the goal of estimating the most likely diachronic trends and biases in
the histories behind these data.
In this paper, we will use one such method in order to evaluate the valid-
ity of two widely-known principles that have been claimed to affect the struc-
ture of agreement paradigms. These are principles that govern the distribution of
patterns of role alignment (accusative, ergative etc.) and the distribution of zero
marking in paradigms. In each case, we interpret these principles as candidates
for diachronic universals. The first principle is what we call “Silverstein’s Law”.
It predicts that paradigms naturally and universally develop in such a way that
ergativity ismore likely in the third than in thefirst and secondperson. The second
principle we test is “Watkins’ Law”, which predicts that naturally and universally
paradigms develop in such a way as to have zero forms in the third rather than in
the first and second person.
Before proceeding, however, an immediate proviso is in order: although the
original formulations of these principles might not have been assumed to have
true universal validity (as in the case of Watkins’ Law), or true diachronic validity
(as in the case of Silverstein’s Law) by their proponents, several scholars have
taken their status as diachronic universals for granted (see for example Koch 1995,
Siewierska 2009 on the distribution of zeros, or Kiparsky 2008 on the distribution
of ergative alignment). Independently of these interpretations in the literature,
we do find it interesting to assess the validity of such principles as diachronic
universals: if they turn out to be valid, they could have far-reaching consequences
for our understanding of how languages change over time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general method
used to test the validity of the two principles and Section 3 describes our data
source. Section 4 deals with the first case study, namely Silverstein’s Law, while
Section 5 discussesWatkins’ Law. Section 6 summarizes the study and draws gen-
eral conclusions.
 Alignment and zero-marking across persons       31
2 Methods
Universal trends in diachrony can be estimated on the basis of synchronic distri-
butions. One method for such estimates is the Family Bias Method (Bickel 2015).
The basic idea is the following: each family is evaluated as towhether its daughter
languages are biased towards a certain structure (such as paradigmswith ergative
alignment in the third rather than the first or second person), as revealed by a
statistical test. If there is such a bias, this means that daughter languages have
preferentially innovated in the samedirection, or theykeptwhatwas already there
in the proto-language. Either way, a bias suggests that – for whatever reason –
there was a systematic preference in the development of the given family. The
absence of a bias suggests random fluctuation in development.
The presence or absence of biases can be determined straightforwardly in
families with enough representatives, using for example a binomial (or multino-
mial) test. But what about smaller families, or families with just one member, i.e.
isolates? These constitute critical data because about half of the world’s language
families are small, mostly in fact having one member. A solution comes from ex-
trapolation algorithms: for this, we can use the information on biases in large
families in order to estimate the biases that are likely to have been behind small
families as well: if, say, 60% of large families are biased towards some specific
structure (e.g., biased towards Silverstein-style alignment patterns in paradigms)
rather than balanced between structures (i.e. with about as many daughters with
such patterns as daughters that contradict the pattern), we estimate a rough .6
probability that the knownmembers of small families come from larger unknown
families with a bias as well, in whatever direction, as opposed to families without
any bias. In some small families, the known or only members will be representa-
tive of the bias in the unknown larger family from which they ultimately derive,
and so we can take their type to reflect the bias. In other cases, the known or
only members will happen to be deviates. The probability of being representa-
tive can be estimated from the strength of the bias in attested large families: for
example, if among biased large families, biases tend to be very strong (e.g. on
average covering over 90% of members), we can estimate a high probability that
the known members of small biased families are representative of the larger un-
known family from which they derive, and only a small proportion is expected to
be non-representative.
Using the probabilities of bias and of representativeness based on large fam-
ilies, we can estimate the proportion of small families that come from larger bi-
ased as opposed to unbiased families, and if they are estimated to come from
biased families, we can estimate whether the known members represent indeed
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the biases of their families or deviate from them. These extrapolation estimates
introduce error, but throughmultiple extrapolation we can arrive at a mean value
that is fairly reliable. The method as summarized here is described and justified
in detail in Bickel (2013), and it is implemented in an R (R Development Core Team
2012) package (Zakharko & Bickel 2011ff.).
Principles are universal only if they hold independently of where families
are located on the globe. This is particularly important with regard to abstract
typological features, such as the distribution of zeros or of ergativity in agreement
paradigms, because abstract patterns like these are known to have spread in large
areas, often in the course of thousands–perhaps even tens of thousands–of years
(Dryer 1989, Nichols 1992). Large areas constitute a confounding factor that needs
to be controlled for. We will do this here by estimating family biases separately
within large areas and conclude universality only if family biases show a signifi-
cant trend that holds world-wide and that is statistically independent of areas.
3 Data
The data for the two case studies come from a survey of individual agreement
paradigms in 314 languages. By ‘agreement’, we understand here only grammati-
cal agreement in the sense of Bickel & Nichols (2007), i.e. verbal markers of argu-
ment properties that can in principle co-occur with a coreferential noun phrase
in the same clause (regardless of whether this co-occurrence is frequent or rare
in discourse). In contrast to such markers, cliticized or incorporated pronouns
that cannot co-occur with co-referential noun phrases in the same clause were
not analyzed as instances of agreement.
By ‘paradigm’, we understand here a set of agreement forms that shares a
unique value in non-agreement categories, such as polarity, tense, aspect, di-
rect vs. inverse, main vs. dependent clause status etc. When agreement patterns
are conditioned by tense, aspect or polarity, a language is represented by two
or more paradigms. For example, in Chortí (ISO639.3:caa; Mayan; Quizar 1994)
completive and incompletive aspects have non-identical distribution of zeros and
alignment patterns. For practical reasons, however, we limited our sample to the
paradigms found in themain clause. Thus, for instance, in the case of Algonquian
languages we considered only the independent order paradigms and excluded
the conjunct order paradigms, etc. As a result of these considerations, our sample
comprises more paradigms than languages, in total 352 paradigms.
Whenparadigms are split into several conjugation classes, we generalize over
them as long as they show the same distribution of alignments and zero mark-
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ers. When the distribution is not uniform, we choose the pattern that is most
frequent, either because it is found in most conjugation classes or because the
classes are the largest in the lexicon (depending on what information is available
in the source). For instance, Latvian has three conjugation classes with several
subclasses. Class II (also referred to as long) and the overwhelming majority of
subclasses in class I (also called short) do not mark the second person singular
present overtly, whereas the verbs of the class III (mixed) use the suffix -i in this
context. In addition, themost productive and numerous classes are I and II. Thus,
the exemplar paradigm selected for Latvian has no overt marker in the second
person singular present (Holst 2001, Mathiassen 1997, Nau 1998).¹
We limit our attention to agreement among lexical predicates that qualify
as open, default classes of their language and exclude agreement paradigms of
predicates that are deficient or deponent or that show special alignment patterns
(such as experiencers coded like objects), any other special behavior or lexical
constraints of any kind. There is only one language in our database, where no de-
fault intransitivepredicate class canbe established for agreement. This is Choctaw
(ISO639.3:cho; Muskogean) and in order to keep the coding consistent, we ex-
cluded this language from further analysis.
A further restriction is that we only look at person distinctions, and even
more simply at only a binary distinction between first and second vs. third person.
When there are subdistinctions within person, such as gender or honorificity, we
coded the category that is said to be unmarked in the source (usually masculine,
non-honorific). We did this in order to factor out confounding effects from these
categories.²
4 Silverstein’s Law
4.1 Background and hypothesis
The alignment of generalized roles (S, A, P etc.) is well-known to be split some-
times within languages, so that some parts align ergatively, some accusatively. If
1 We did not assess the relative frequency of paradigms in terms of discourse frequency. This
would be a very expensive project, and we doubt that results would have a major impact on our
general findings since the number of relevant splits is too rare to begin with.
2 The dataset used in this study is available for download at http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/
9783110399967.suppl, once coded for alignments and once coded for zeros, following the coding
principles explained below.
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such a split is governed by a difference in person, it is commonly expected that
we find accusative alignment in the first and second and ergative alignment in
the third person. This idea was developed in the 1970s (e.g. , Silverstein 1976) and
was originally formulated in terms of a synchronic generalization.³ Later on, it
has also been rephrased in terms of an absolute, non-violable property of Univer-
sal Grammar (Aissen 1999) that constrains how languages can or cannot change
(Kiparsky 2008).
Here we test this prediction as a statistical diachronic universal, calling it
‘Silverstein’s Law’. We expect that, if paradigms have a person-conditioned split
in alignment, they are more likely to develop in such a way that ‘S=A’ alignment
(i.e. accusative or neutral) is found in the first and second person and ‘S ̸=A’
alignment (i.e. ergative) in the third person, rather than the other way round. If a
paradigm shows the preferred pattern, it is expected to be preserved as such over
time; if a paradigm violates the pattern, it is expected to develop the preferred
pattern. This is visualized in Figure 1, where paradigms are represented by boxes
and where the thickness of arrows depicts the expected probability of diachronic
developments between paradigms.
1/2: S=A
3: S≠A
1/2: S≠A
3: S=A
Fig. 1: Hypothesis of Silverstein’s Law as a diachronic universal affecting agreement
paradigms
Apart from person, other features – especially animacy and number – are ex-
pected to affect the distribution of ergativity as well. However, we limit our atten-
tion in the following to person only because person is by far the most widespread
agreement category in the world. If Silverstein’s Law leaves a detectable statis-
tical signal anywhere, one would expect this to be first and foremost in person
agreement.
3 Note that not all claims about the distribution of alignment types over person focus on or even
include agreement systems. Comrie (1981) for example limits the claim to case marking and does
not consider agreemeent systems.
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4.2 Alignment coding
For determining alignment types, we focus on the coding of S, A, and P argument
roles and exclude arguments of three-argument verbs from our present purview.
S, A, and P are defined by numerical valency and semantic entailment properties
of lexical predicates, following earlier proposals of ours (e.g., Bickel & Nichols
2009, Bickel 2011, Witzlack-Makarevich 2011). We understand alignment type as
a particular grouping of S, A, and P argument roles in a specific morphosyntactic
operation, here agreement marking: if an agreement marker, or a set of agree-
ment markers, treats S and A alike, as it does for example in English or Latin,
S aligns with A, while P is kept apart insofar as it does not trigger agreement
marking. In English, the third person triggers s-agreement with both S arguments
(hework-s) andA arguments (he see-sme), but notwith P arguments (*I see-s him).
Such a pattern (i.e. S=A ̸=P) is traditionally known as accusative alignment. Other
possibilities are S=P ̸=A (ergative alignment), S=A=P (neutral alignment), S ̸=A ̸=P
(tripartite alignment), and, finally, S ̸=A=P (horizontal alignment).
Determining alignment in agreement paradigms can be non-trivial, mostly
because individual agreement markers can pattern in a way that differs from
the basic question of which arguments ever trigger agreement (Siewierska 2003,
Bickel et al. 2013). For example, in an agreement paradigm like that of Swahili
(ISO639.3:swh; Benue-Congo) individual agreementmarkers pattern accusative-
ly: the S and A arguments of the third person singular in noun class I require the
agreement prefix a- ‘3s.I.S/A’, whereas the P argument requires the prefix mw-
‘3s.I.P’. On the other hand, when one asks which arguments trigger agreement,
the answer would be S, A, and P alike (i.e. neutral) because they all trigger
agreement of some kind:
(1) a. a-li-mw-ona
3sI.S/A-PST-3sI.P-see
mbuzi.
goat
‘S/he (A) saw the goat (P).’
b. a-li-kimbia.
3sI.S/A-PST-run
‘S/he (S) ran.’
Whenever there is such a discrepancy, we determine alignment on the basis of
individual agreementmarkers as they appear or fail to appear in specificmorpho-
logical positions/slots, following the procedure described in detail in Bickel et al.
(2013). Thus, the data in (1) are coded as follows: in the first prefix position, we get
accusative alignment for the third person since S and A are marked by a- while P
is not marked. In the third position, i.e. after the tense marker, the third person is
again accusatively aligned but for a different reason: here it is based on the fact
that P is marked bymw-while S and A are treated alike by not being marked. The
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pattern in (1) is not the only one in Swahili; under certain semantic and pragmatic
conditions, there is no overt P agreement:
(2) a-li-ona
3sI.S/A-PST-see
mbuzi.
goat
‘S/he (A) saw a goat (P).’
In this case, Swahili has neutral alignment in the third position since now all
arguments are alike in failing to show any agreement exponence in that slot. We
determined alignment separately in each condition that a language may put on
its agreement paradigms.
Computing alignments in this way has the advantage that the specific mor-
phological structure of paradigms is respected. The disadvantage is that in lan-
guages like Swahili one looses the generalization that only S and A are marked
in the first and only P argument in the third slot, so that one could derive the ac-
cusative alignment in the third slot from the accusative alignment in the first slot.
However, the situation in Swahili is very special, and generalizations of this kind
are far from being universal. There are many languages where the distribution of
S, A and P markers is not tied to specific positions. In Pipil (ISO639.3:ppl; Uto-
Aztecan; Campbell 1985) or Puma (ISO639.3:pum; Kiranti branch of Sino-Tibetan;
Bickel et al. 2007), for example, the same positions cover S, A and Pmarkers alike.
Consider first person singular agreement in the Puma past affirmative paradigm:
(3) a. cind-u-ŋ
teach[-PST]-3sP-1sA
‘I (A) taught him/her (P)’
b. t v-cind-oŋ
2-teach-1sS/P.PST
‘you (A) taught me (P)’
c. p v-cind-oŋ
3sA-teach-1sS/P.PST
‘s/he (A) taught me (P)’
d. phind-oŋ
jump-1sS/P.PST
‘I (S) jumped’
First person alignment is neutral in the prefix position as all roles are alike in
having zero realization, except for the second person, which is realized as t v- (3b),
and the third person which is realized as p v- (3c). This differs from the final suffix
position, where the first person shows ergative alignment: it is registered as -oŋ in
S and P function (cf. 3b and 3c for P, and 3d for S) but as -ŋ in A function (3a). Un-
like in Swahili, the alignment in the prefix position cannot be predicted from the
alignment in the suffix position, or vice versa. Thus, in order to be able to capture
alignment in all agreement paradigms, we coded alignment separately for each
person in eachmorphological position. In order to achieve consistency, we do this
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in all languages, including languages like Swahili, where one could in principle
also characterize the alignment patterns in terms of generalized positions.
The Puma data point to yet another problem: the alignment pattern in a spe-
cific person category can depend on the presence of other person markers in the
same form. For the second person, alignment in Puma is neutral in the prefix
position since all roles show t v- here. Compare the following forms (and also 3b,
which is parallel to 4a, with t v-marking A):
(4) a. t v-cind-i
2-teach-3sP.PST
‘you (A) taught him/her (P)’
b. t v-cind-a
2-teach-PST
‘s/he (A) taught you (P)’
c. t v-phind-a
2-jump-PST
‘you (S) jumped’
These forms show that t v- occurs in all three roles. However, when the second
person combines with a first person, the pattern is different, as there is no prefix
in this case:
(5) cin-na-a
teach-1>2-PST
‘I (A) taught you (P)’
Here, second person P is realized by means of the suffix -na ‘first person acting
on second person’. This form contrasts with t v- which in the same first person
context covers the A role (3b) and which also covers the S role (4c), thus con-
stituting accusative alignment. This kind of split, which is conditioned by co-
arguments, is very common in Puma and similar languages (Bickel et al. 2013).
For example, third person in Puma shows ergative alignment in the prefixposition
when co-occurring with a first person: there is a marker p v- in the form for ‘s/he
taught me’ (3c) while the third person lacks overt marking in the prefix position
when it is in the P function (as in the ‘I taught him/her’ form in 3a) or in the S
function (phind-a ‘jump-PST’, i.e. ‘s/he jumped’). However, when the third person
co-occurs with a third person, it also lacks overt marking in the prefix position
(cind-i ‘teach-3sP.PST’, i.e. ‘s/he taught him/her’), and so, alignment is neutral
here. (The distribution is again different in the suffix position, where third person
aligns accusatively).
In response to these issues, we coded alignment not only per person in each
slot but also relative to the co-arguments that a form might have. This increases
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the number of alignment statements considerably, as combinations multiply. For
example, third person S can be compared to third person A when co-occurring
with first person P and to third person P when co-occurring with first person A;
or to third person A when co-occurring with second person P and to third person
P when co-occurring with first person A, and so on. Summary characterizations
of paradigms then need to be statistical, e.g., via the empirical distribution of
alignment types, or the proportion of accusative vs. ergative alignments, etc. In
the following we focus on the distribution of S=A(=P) vs. S ̸=A alignments, in line
with the hypothesis put forward above.
4.3 Results
Of the 352 paradigms, only 52 show an S=A vs. S ̸=A split, distributed over 42 lan-
guages. Almost all cases come from Algonquian (10 languages) and the Kiranti
subgroup of Sino-Tibetan (19). The rest is found inMayan (7 languages), Southern
Nilotic (Teso, ISO639.3:teo), Pano-Tacanan (Reyesano, ISO639.3:rey), Macro-
Ge (Bororo, ISO639.3:bor), Sepik (Namambu, ISO639.3:mle) and in the isolates
Ainu (ISO639.3:ain) and Zuni (ISO639.3:zun). In order to assess the distribu-
tions of the alignments, we computed for each paradigm the proportion of S=A
vs. S ̸=A alignments within all first and second persons and, separately, within all
third person forms (i.e. across all number and other distinctions and across all
co-arguments that they combine with). The results of this are reported in Table 1
and summarized in Figure 2.
The last column in the table reports whether S=A alignments are more com-
mon in the first and second person than in the third. According to Silverstein’s
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S≠
A)
al
ig
nm
en
ts
in
pa
ra
di
gm
sw
ith
sp
lit
s
St
oc
k
Br
an
ch
La
ng
ua
ge
Pa
ra
di
gm
Pr
op
(S
=A
)
Pr
op
(S
=A
)
Di
ff.
in
1/
2
in
3
Ai
nu
Ai
nu
0.811
1.000
−0.189
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
Ar
ap
ah
o
IN
DE
P
0.762
0.719
0.043
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
At
ik
am
ek
w
IN
DE
P.N
PS
T
0.879
0.789
0.091
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
Bl
ac
kf
oo
t
IN
DE
P.A
FF
0.814
0.923
−0.109
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
Ch
ey
en
ne
IN
DE
P.P
RS
.IN
D
0.801
0.690
0.111
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
Cr
ee
(P
la
in
s)
IN
DE
P
0.887
0.691
0.196
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
M
en
om
in
i
IN
DE
P
0.845
0.846
−0.001
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
M
icm
ac
IN
DE
P.I
ND
0.868
0.639
0.229
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
M
un
se
e
IN
DE
P.N
PS
T
0.806
0.676
0.130
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
Oj
ib
wa
(E
as
te
rn
)
IN
DE
P.P
RS
0.832
0.799
0.033
Al
gi
c
Al
go
nq
ui
an
Pa
ss
am
aq
uo
dd
y
IN
DE
P.P
RS
0.839
0.788
0.051
M
ac
ro
-G
e
Bo
ro
ro
Bo
ro
ro
0.000
0.500
−0.500
M
ay
an
Gr
.K
an
jo
ba
la
n
Ja
ca
lte
c
0 .000
0.500
−0.500
M
ay
an
Gr
.T
ze
lta
la
n
Ch
on
ta
lM
ay
a
PF
V
0.556
0.667
−0.111
M
ay
an
Gr
.T
ze
lta
la
n
Ch
or
tí
NC
OM
PL
0.833
0.667
0.167
M
ay
an
Gr
.T
ze
lta
la
n
Ch
or
tí
CO
M
PL
0.333
0.333
0.000
M
ay
an
Qu
ich
ea
n-
M
am
ea
n
Qu
ich
e
0.000
0.250
−0.250
M
ay
an
Qu
ich
ea
n-
M
am
ea
n
Tz
ut
uj
il
0.000
0.250
−0.250
M
ay
an
Yu
ca
te
ca
n
Itz
aj
CO
M
PL
0.200
0.167
0.033
M
ay
an
Yu
ca
te
ca
n
Yu
ca
te
c
CO
M
PL
0.200
0.167
0.033
Ni
lo
tic
So
ut
he
rn
Ni
lo
tic
Te
so
1.000
0.671
0.329
Pa
no
-Ta
ca
n
Ta
ca
n
Re
ye
sa
no
0.706
0.986
−0.281
Se
pi
k
M
id
dl
eS
ep
ik
(N
du
)
M
am
bu
0.000
0.500
−0.500
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
At
hp
ar
e
IN
D
0.878
0.946
−0 .069
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ba
hi
ng
PS
T.I
ND
.A
FF
0.909
0.889
0.021
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ba
hi
ng
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.914
0.894
0.020
40       Balthasar Bickel, Alena Witzlack-Makarevich, Taras Zakharko and Giorgio Iemmolo
Ta
bl
e1
:(
co
nt
in
ue
d)
St
oc
k
Br
an
ch
La
ng
ua
ge
Pa
ra
di
gm
Pr
op
(S
=A
)
Pr
op
(S
=A
)
Di
ff.
in
1/
2
in
3
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ba
nt
aw
a
0.839
0.853
−0.013
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Be
lh
ar
e
0.870
0.963
−0.093
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ca
m
lin
g
IN
D.
AF
F
0.808
0.838
−0.030
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ch
in
ta
ng
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.847
0.905
−0.059
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Du
m
i
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.837
0.606
0.231
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ha
yu
PS
T.I
ND
.A
FF
0.937
0.915
0.021
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ha
yu
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.898
0.879
0.019
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Je
ro
0.756
0.768
−0.011
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Kõ
ic
PS
T.I
ND
.A
FF
0.954
0.852
0.102
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Kõ
ic
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.972
1.000
−0.028
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ko
yi
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.835
0.859
−0.023
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ko
yi
PS
T.I
ND
.A
FF
0.864
0.894
− 0.030
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ku
lu
ng
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.854
0.964
−0.110
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ku
lu
ng
PS
T.I
ND
.A
FF
0.844
0.964
−0.120
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Lim
bu
PS
T.I
ND
.A
FF
0.855
0.946
−0.091
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Lim
bu
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.849
0.946
−0.097
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Lo
ho
ru
ng
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.822
0.904
−0.082
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Lo
ho
ru
ng
PS
T.I
ND
.A
FF
0.822
0.904
−0.082
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Pu
m
a
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.877
0.870
0.007
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Pu
m
a
PS
T.I
ND
.A
FF
0.877
0.870
0.007
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Th
ul
un
g
NP
ST
.IN
D.
AF
F
0.911
0.949
−0.038
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Th
ul
un
g
PS
T.I
ND
.A
FF
0.917
0.949
−0.033
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
W
am
bu
le
0. 756
0.657
0.100
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ya
kk
ha
0.881
0.953
−0.071
Si
no
-Ti
be
ta
n
Ki
ra
nt
i
Ya
m
ph
u
IN
D.
AF
F
0.836
0.961
−0.125
Zu
ni
Zu
ni
0.500
0.500
0.000
 Alignment and zero-marking across persons       41
Law, this should tend to be the case. However, as the histogram of differences
in Figure 2 shows, there are far more paradigms that contradict this, resulting in
negative numbers, viz. 60% paradigms (31 out 52). Only 40% of the paradigms
follow Silverstein’s Law. The histogram also suggests that most differences cluster
around0, i.e.most paradigms simply showonly amarginal differencebetween the
proportions of S=A alignments across persons.
Aggregating the proportions per family allows us to estimate diachronic bi-
ases along the lines described in the methods section, although given the small
number of relevant families, we do not extrapolate to small families here. The
results show that Algonquian is the only large family with a bias towards obeying
Silverstein’s Law, with 8 out 10 paradigms following it. But even in Algonquian,
the trend is only borderline significant (one-sided binomial test, p = .055), and
we are therefore reluctant to infer a diachronic bias in the family based on this.We
conclude that there is no support for Silverstein’s Law in agreement paradigms.
The other families with splits do not show the slightest bias in line with the hy-
pothesis from Figure 1. Mayan and Kiranti even have slight biases against the
hypothesis. In Mayan, 5 out 8 paradigms contradict the hypothesis; in Kiranti,
19 out of 28 paradigms contradict it (which is in fact even statistically significant
at a 5% rejection level).
Among the families for which we have only one representative each, Ainu,
Bororo, Reyesano, and Manambu also contradict the hypothesis (Table 1); only
the Nilotic language Teso supports it, while Zuni is neutral in this regard (having
S ̸=A in the plural in all persons and neutral alignment in the singular).
4.4 A non-paradigmatic interpretation of Silverstein’s Law?
While there is no support for Silverstein’s Law as explicated in Figure 1, the ques-
tion arises whether there is support for it under a different interpretation. So far
we have looked at paradigm structures, counting different alignment typeswithin
each paradigm separately (Table 1) and assessing family biases on the paradigms
in a second step only. Under an alternative, ‘non-paradigmatic’ interpretation,
Silverstein’s Law does not operate on paradigm structures but predicts a higher
probability for S=A alignment in first and second than in third persons more gen-
erally and cross-cutting paradigms.
To test whether Silverstein’s Law has more empirical support under such an
interpretation,weperformeda family bias analysiswithout respectingparadigms.
We first split the data into data on alignment in the first and second person and
data on alignment in the third person. Using the method explained in Section 2,
we then estimated the extent to which there are family biases towards S=A align-
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Fig. 3: Family bias estimates ignoring paradigm structures (based on all 314 languages)
ment in each dataset, controlling for large-scalemacro-areas.⁴ The results of these
estimates (including now extrapolations to small families and isolates) is shown
in Figure 3.⁵
The figure leaves out families that are diverse because the absence of any bias
gives no evidence of the direction of diachronic developments (Bickel 2013). The
figure shows that, in each area, there are about as many families with biases in
each direction in the first or second person as families with biases in each di-
rection in the third person. This suggests that Silverstein’s Law has no empirical
support under a non-paradigmatic interpretation either.
The findings confirm earlier conclusions by Bickel (2008), which were based
on a different and smaller dataset (that of Bakker & Siewierksa 2006), adopted a
different method for coding alignments (focusing on overall types of splits, rather
than on alignment proportions), and relied on a more qualitative than quantita-
tive approach.
5 Watkins’ Law
5.1 Background
In its original formulation, Watkins’s Law concerns the analogical reanalysis and
subsequent reorganization of inflectional paradigms on the basis of the third per-
son singular. The law was proposed by Watkins (1962) for a number of ancient
4 Wedid this by running the familybias function (Zakharko&Bickel 2011ff) directly on a binary
re-codeof the alignment statement, differentiating only betweenS=Avs. S ̸=A.Weused thedefault
setting of the function.
5 Here and in all other figures below, we use the ‘mosaic’ visualization technique of Meyer et al.
(2006), so that the sizes of tiles in the graph are proportional to the number of families in each
condition.
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Indo-European languages aswell as in the reconstruction of Proto-Indo-European
(seeWatkins 1969). Watkins (1962:90–96) proposes a scenario according to which
third person markers are reanalyzed as part of the verbal stem, thus giving rise
to zero marking in the third person. An illustration of this process comes from
the reanalysis of the third person singular ending -t as part of the verbal stem
from Proto-Iranian to Persian (cf. Watkins 1962:94). The process is represented in
Table 2.
Table 2: Singular agreement forms of ‘to be’ from Proto-Iranian to Persian
Proto-Iranian Persian
1sg *as-mi ≻ *as-m ≻ *ast-m ≻ hast-am
2sg *as-i ≻ *as-i ≻ *ast-i ≻ hast-i
3sg *as-ti ≻ *as-t ≻ *ast-0 ≻ *ast-0 ≻ hast-0
The reanalysis comprises several aspects. First, -t is reanalyzed as part of the ver-
bal stem ast. The new stem then becomes the basis for the rest of the paradigm.
This in turn leaves the third person form ast identical with the stem, i.e. without a
proper ending. The paradigmatic opposition to the first and second person finally
establishes a zero exponent in this form, specialized for third person agreement.
The same analysis applies,mutatis mutandis, to other languages across the Indo-
European family (see for example Bybee & Brewer 1980 on Provençal, Haiman
1977 on Vallader Rumantsch, among others).
As stated by Watkins (1962:178), the reanalysis of third person as having zero
exponence constitutes a “general linguistic phenomenon”. Koch (1995:64) has
indeed proposed that such processes should be seen as driven by a general di-
achronic principle, according towhich a formwhich expresses via non-zeromark-
ing a feature that is typologically expected to be zero marked (such as a third
person) is likely to be reanalyzed as having zero exponence. The validity of this
process as a general diachronic principle, however, has been questioned by, e.g.,
Hock (1986:218–222),who considers the evidence for the reanalysis of third person
as “meager”.
Reanalysis is not the only possible process through which zero exponence
arises. Another possibility is that a language never developed overt marking for
the third person. In some language families the evidence in fact points towards
a “non-development” scenario, that is a scenario where overt marking for third
person never arose. Such a scenario is exemplified by Uralic languages. In Proto-
Uralic, only first and second person suffixes are reconstructable for S/A (Collinder
1965:58, Körtvély 2005). Third person is very often unmarked in modern Uralic
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languages: when overtly marked, there is considerable heterogeneity in the inno-
vated markers (see also Comrie 1981).
The classical explanation for the lack of overt marking in the third person
goes back to Jakobson’s (1932) and Benveniste’s (1946:227–232) characterization
of the third person as a “non-person”, negatively defined. Zeros are more likely to
be found in the third person as opposed to first and second because of its “imper-
sonal, non-referring nature”, as Benveniste has it. The restructuring of paradigms
based on Watkins’ Law is explained, e.g., by Koch (1995), in terms of iconicity:
this is due to the tendency for paradigms to encode via zero the “non-person” as
opposed to first and second.
Under either the reanalysis or thenon-development scenarios outlinedabove,
Watkins’ Law predicts that languages should preferentially develop andmaintain
paradigms with zero-marked third person, as for example in the Persian Aorist
or in the Puma Intransitive Past, summarized in Table 3 (cf. Section 4.2 for de-
tails on Puma). Watkins’ Law should disfavor paradigms such as the one found
in the English Present tense, where only the third person is overtly marked, as
well as paradigms such as the one in the Persian present tense, where all per-
sons have overt exponence (cf. the rightmost columns in Table 3). Note that the
reason for being disfavored are different in the English and the Persian Present
tense paradigms: the English paradigm is disfavored because it has zeros ‘in the
wrong place’; the Persian paradigm is disfavored because it would be expected to
undergo reanalysis along the lines sketched in Table 2 – not categorically, but as
a worldwide trend.
Table 3: Favored and disfavored paradigms according to Watkins’ Law
Favored Disfavored
Persian Aorist Puma Intransitive Past English Present Persian Present
(‘go’) (‘jump’) (‘go’)
1sg raft-am phind-oŋ like-0 mi-rav-am
2sg raft-i t v-phinda like-0 mi-rav-i
3sg raft-0 0-phinda-0 like-s mi-rav-ad
Following the scheme used to visualize Silverstein’s Law in Section 4, Figure 4
visualizesWatkins’ Law as a diachronic universal operating on paradigms (where
again paradigms are represented by boxes and probabilities of diachronic devel-
opment by arrow thickness; ‘x’ stands here for any overt marker).
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Fig. 4: Hypothesis of Watkins’ Law as a diachronic universal affecting agreement paradigms
5.2 Coding
For this study, we specified for each person feature whether or not it has any overt
marking in its agreementmorphology. If paradigms also register number, we limit
our attention to the way person is marked in the singular number. Non-singular
number strongly tends to induce overtmarking because it is a structurallymarked
category (Greenberg 1966b). Any such effect would cancel out possible signals
fromWatkins’ Law.
When agreement is sensitive to co-arguments in the way explained in Sec-
tion 4.2, we coded all relevant singular forms, for example third person singular,
when occurring as S, when occurring as A acting upon first person singular, dual,
etc. P, or on second person singular, dual etc., when occurring as P being acted
open by a first person singular, dual, etc. A argument, and so on. Like in the
previous study, this has the consequence that, for some paradigms, there is a
substantial number of entries in the database.
5.3 Results
For each agreement paradigm, we computed the proportion of overt markers in
first and second person as opposed to third person and then determined for each
paradigm whether it obeys Watkins’ Law, i.e. whether it has more zero markers
in the third than in the other persons. Only 35% of the paradigms in our dataset
follow the law. All others have what is expected to be a disfavored structure in
Table 3 and what appears on the left side in Figure 4. This is in line with what
Cysouw (2003:53) observes in a survey of paradigms involving syncretism (like
English, where first and second person syncretize): there is no evidence for zeros
to be more common among third than among non-third persons.
Estimates of family biases on whether paradigms obey vs. violate Watkins’
Law are given in Figure 5. The results show that there is no support for Watkins’
Law as a diachronic universal: families are not more likely to be biased towards
developing and maintaining paradigms in line with the law than they are likely
to be biased in the opposite direction. In terms of the visualization in Figure 4,
this means that all arrows should have about the same thickness, or that indeed
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the arrows from the favored (on the right-hand side) to the disfavored (on the
left-hand side) paradigm should be thicker than those from the disfavored to the
favored paradigm type (except perhaps in the Americas where this trend seems to
be weaker).
Africa Eurasia Pacific Americas
bias towards
fitting
Watkins' Law
bias against
fitting
Watkins' Law
Fig. 5: Family bias estimates on paradigm structures
The only large families (taken here to be familieswith at least fivemembers) in our
sample that abide by Watkins’ Law are Mayan and Kiranti. For Mayan, the bias
is complete: all Mayan paradigms in our dataset comply with Watkins’ Law. For
Kiranti, the bias is incomplete, but strong and statistically significant (90% fit,
N = 30, p < .001 under a one-sided binomial test). In addition, there is a bor-
derline trend in Algonquian (75% fit, N = 12, p = .073). Beyond these three
cases, all other large families in our dataset showa bias againstWatkins’ Law (e.g.
Oceanic, Berber, Chimbu-Wahgi, Dravidian, Nakh-Daghestanian, Omotic, Torri-
celli, Tucánoan,Uralic,West Papuan). This also includes Indo-European, the fam-
ily for which it was originally formulated. Of all the 28 Indo-European languages
in our dataset (sampled from all branches except Tocharian), only 5 languages
(Latvian, Slovene, Provençal, Nepali, and of course Persian) have at least one
paradigm that complies with Watkins’ Law. All others are of the type that would
be disfavored by the law, as illustrated above in Table 3, most of them with overt
agreement markers in all persons (like in the Persian Present tense paradigm in
the table).
We conclude that Watkins’ Law receives no support when tested against a
large cross-linguistic sample: there is no cross-linguistic tendency for languages to
develop paradigms with zero-marked third person and overt marking for first and
second either via reanalysis or by non-development. Note that this does not in-
validateWatkins’ Law as a description of what happened in individual paradigms
such as the Persian Aorist; but it means that such a process is not motivated by a
universal principle – that is, it cannot be said to be a “natural” development.
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5.4 A non-paradigmatic interpretation of Watkins’ Law
Like in the study of Silverstein’s Law, the question arises whether Watkins’ Law
has better support if it is interpreted differently. In its original formulation and
in the way we approached it so far (cf. Figure 4), the law is interpreted as a force
driving the structuring of paradigms. However, it is also possible to interpret the
law as affecting the distribution of zeromarking independently of paradigm struc-
tures. The hypothesis then is this: zero markers are more likely to be found in the
third than in the first or second person, across all paradigms in a family.
The motivation for such a hypothesis derives from grammaticalization the-
ory. It has often been proposed that agreement markers develop from indepen-
dent pronouns (see, e.g., Givón 1976, Ariel 2000). The distribution of third person
pronouns leads one to expect that they end up as zeros when they grammati-
calize into agreement morphology. Bybee (1985) suggests that this higher likeli-
hood for zero agreement markers in third person is due to the lower frequency of
overt third person pronouns in discourse. An alternative account, making oppo-
site assumptions on frequency, is given by Greenberg (1966a:65–69). According
to this account, third person forms are usually realized as zeros because of their
higher frequency in discourse, given that third person forms accompany lexical
NPswhilefirst and seconddonot. Then, higher frequency leads to phonetic reduc-
tion and loss or reanalysis of overtmarking. In a third account, elaborated byAriel
(2000), third person forms are more frequently zero not because of their relative
frequency, but rather because of their lower accessibility in discourse compared
to first and second person. Whatever explanation has ultimately the best empir-
ical and theoretical support, a grammaticalization-based theory is plausible and
worth testing.
To test the hypothesis, we proceeded in the same way as with the non-
paradigmatic version of Silverstein’s Law: we split the data on individual agree-
ment makers into a set for first and second person and a set for third person.
Within these, we estimated family biases towards the development or persistence
of zero marking. Figure 6 shows the results.
Like before, we leave out families that are diverse, i.e. families that lack a
bias in any direction, because they give no support for or against the hypothe-
sis.⁶ For families with a bias, the hypothesis predicts that there should be signifi-
cantlymore families biased towards zero-marking among third person forms than
6 Note that the number of diverse families is different when looking at first and second as op-
posed to third person forms. As a result, the total counts of biased families differs in some areas.
This is reflected by unequal tiles in the plot.
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Fig. 6: Family bias estimates on individual agreement forms
among first or second person forms, independently of areas. This is statistically
supported, although the effects are relatively week (as the figure shows). A likeli-
hood ratio test on loglinear models shows that the interaction between person ×
bias direction is significant (χ2 = 5.26, p = .022) and at the same independent
of a further three-way interaction with area (χ2 = .79, p = .85).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we assessed the validity of two hypotheses on possible principles
that shape agreement morphology over time. Our data lend no support for what
we call Silverstein’s Law in agreement morphology: the distribution of S ̸=A and
S=A alignment in the structure of agreement morphology does not appear to be
subject to general principles but seems to be the result of individual processes.
Watkins’ Law, by contrast, shows more empirical success but only if the law is
interpreted not as a factor that operates on paradigms but as a factor in the gram-
maticalization of individual agreement markers, independently of and cutting
across paradigms: across the board, third person markers are more likely to de-
velop and maintain zero exponence than first and second person markers.
This finding suggests that paradigm structures are perhaps generally less
open to universal factors than individual markers (or constructions). A possible
explanation for this could come from the observation that paradigm structures
tend to be simultaneously affected by a vast range of independent developments,
from phonological change to analogical leveling. As a result of this, general
principles cannot easily exert systematic effects that leave clear and detectable
signals in daughter languages. The grammaticalization of individual markers,
by contrast, can proceed in a relatively independent manner, so that general
principles can channel these developments along universal pathways. It is an
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open issue for future research to determine whether this difference is of relevance
beyond the phenomena we looked at in the present study.
Our finding also invites further research on the theoretical background of
why the grammaticalization of third persons tends to end up in zeros more of-
ten than the grammaticalization of first and second person. As the discussion in
Section 5.4 suggests, progress in this crucially depends on a better understanding
of frequency distributions in discourse and their effects on language change. This
ultimately requires large-scale corpus research across a larger variety of languages
and genres than have traditionally been looked at so far.
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